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Abstract
In this paper, we study how deficit financing is affected by the introduction of habit
formation in an otherwise standard Gale (JET, 1973) economy in which the government is a
net lender and young agents are borrowing rather than saving. We find that the amount of
deficit the government is able to float into the economy is lower when habits are present.
This finding is due to the fact that habit persistence puts a cap on borrowing.
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Recently there has been renewed interest in Adam Smith's (1759) idea that habits may
play a key role in consumption behavior. This is because habit formation can explain certain
empirical ¯ndings that are di±cult to reconcile using the traditional models in which utility is
time-separable.1 In this paper, we explore how de¯cit ¯nancing is a®ected by the introduction
of habit formation in an otherwise standard Gale (1973) economy
in which the government is a net lender and young agents are borrowing rather than
saving.
Overlapping generations (OG) models have long been a standard framework in the litera-
ture for examining ¯scal policy. Within the OG setup, Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) introduce
habit persistence in a conventional Gale (1973) economy. The authors ¯nd that this simple
modi¯cation can a®ect the dynamics and the stability properties of the modi¯ed pure ex-
change economy. Habit persistence, by altering the saving behavior of the young, can induce
higher savings compared to a standard economy and can also yield optimal savings that are
a decreasing function of the interest rate. Moreover, the authors ¯nd that \the government
is able to °oat higher de¯cits in
an economy with habit persistence relative to an economy without habits".2
We argue that this conclusion does not always hold. In particular, we show that under
a scenario in which the optimal amount of private borrowing is positive and the gross rate
of return on government loans is greater than one, steady state de¯cits under habits are
smaller than de¯cits under no habits. Since an increase in the strength of habits lowers
desired borrowing under habit persistence, the model predicts that the spread between de¯cit
¯nancing among the two speci¯cations is an increasing function of the strength of habits.
2 Model
We consider a pure exchange OG model. Each generation is alive for two periods and has
perfect foresight. Economic activity takes place over in¯nite discrete time. Each generation
is endowed with w1 units of the unique good when young and w2 units when old. Utility is
derived from consumption in both periods, c1 and c2. However, due to the presence of habit
formation, utility of a given level of consumption when old depends on consumption when
young.3 Formally:
V (c1;c2) = log(c1) + ¯log(c2 ¡ °c1) (1)
where °2 [0;1] measures the strength of habits in the instantaneous utility function and
¯ > 0 is the discount factor. The importance of past consumption in determining the utility
derived from the \e®ective" second period consumption, c2 ¡ °c1, is increasing with °.
Each young generation maximizes utility subject to their budget constraints: c1 = w1+zt
when young and c2 = w2 ¡ Rtzt when old, where zt denotes private borrowing when young
and Rt is the gross nominal interest rate at time t. Contrary to the piece of Lahiri and
1For a survey on the role of habit persistence in solving economic puzzles, see Messinis (1999).
2Lahiri and Puhakka (1998), p.177.
3Speci¯cally, the absolute level of consumption in the second period as well as the increase of second
period relative to ¯rst period consumption are important. The more that was consumed when young, the
more is required to derive the same level of utility in the following period.
1Puhakka (1998) we model the case in which the young agents are observed borrowing rather
than saving and they need to repay these liabilities once they become old.
Let us denote variables under habit persistence with a hat and those in the standard
Gale (1973) economy with a star. The optimal borrowing function under habits is given by:
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We need to impose conditions on the parameters of the economy to insure that the indi®er-
ence curves are downward sloping so that we are in the economically meaningful area.4 The
following condition simply emphasizes the fact that the endowments must lie above the point






The inequality above also implies that the borrowings are positive (^ zt > 0).
Now let us consider the government budget constraint. If the government is lending to
the public, then we have:
dt + Rt¡1lt¡1 = lt; (5)
where lt denotes the beginning of the period t government lending as in Sargent (1987),
dt represents the real de¯cit, and Rt is the return on government debt or loans. To study
the maximum feasible government de¯cit at the steady state, a stationarity assumption on
de¯cit is made such that dt = d, 8t. Asset market equilibrium requires lt = ¡zt, 8t, where
zt denotes optimal borrowing. The maximum sustainable steady state de¯cit is obtained by
choosing a rate of return R such that d(R) = (R¡1)z(R) is maximized. Note that there are
two potential scenarios for which the maximum sustainable steady state de¯cit is positive:
(i) positive savings by households (z(R) < 0) and returns on government debt smaller than
one, and (ii) positive borrowing by households and returns on government loans greater than
one.
Here, following Farmer (1986) and De la Croix and Michel (2002), we consider a situation
where there is de¯cit but the government is still a net lender such that households have
positive private borrowings and Rt > 1.
The steady state de¯cit under habits and no habits can be expressed as follows:
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We can check that d¤ > ^ d. Analytically, the di®erence in de¯cit ¯nancing between the two







2cases is given by:
d
¤ ¡ ^ d =
°(R ¡ 1)(w2 + Rw1)
R(° + R)(1 + ¯)
> 0 8R > 1
Furthermore, this gap increases with the strength of habits:
@(d¤ ¡ ^ d)
@°
=
(R ¡ 1)(w2 + w1R)
(R + °)2(1 + ¯)
> 0
The intuition is straightforward: an increase in the strength of habits typically increases
optimal individual savings, whereas in our case it actually decreases borrowings. Thus the
spread between the two de¯cits becomes larger as ° increases. Clearly, the strength of habits
are very important in determining the maximum de¯cit ¯nancing that a government can
support.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we study de¯cit ¯nancing in a two period OG economy with habit persis-
tence. We show that when young households borrow and the government is a net lender (but
still runs a positive de¯cit every period), then the de¯cit in a standard economy is higher
than the one in a framework with habit persistence.
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